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The Dual-Drive Concept of 
Product Innovation 
C. Merle Crawford 
Neither technology 
nor markets can drive 
product innovation 
by themselves. They 





says that a firm 
should be  either 
market driven or 
technology d r iven- -  
that is, give the mar- 
ket either what it 
wants or what tech- 
nologists believe it 
will want. Quaker  
gave us cinnamon- 
flavored instant oat- 
meal. Edwin Land gave us the Polaroid Camera 
and Polavision. 
This view is simplistic, and in yesterday's 
world it worked pretty well. But research shows 
that top players know the push-pull approach is 
wrong today. These people  want push and 
pu l l - -a  market drive and a technology dr ive--a t  
the same time. For example,  pharmaceutical firms 
are said to be technology driven; but their re- 
search centers are staffed with MDs (customers), 
and they have the world's best set of market data 
on disease incidence and needs. In the same 
vein, "consumer-driven" Procter & Gamble (P&G) 
pairs its consumer knowledge with two levels of 
advanced technology research, and only rarely 
will they market a product that is not technically 
superior. In fact, Pringles potato chips was a fail- 
ure of technology drive, and in P&G yet! 
The new approach can best be called dual 
drive, to contrast it with the two single drives of 
technology and market. In the dual-drive ap- 
proach, every new product project, before it gets 
under  way, has the dual direction of a specific 
market (user problem) and a specific technology 
that will be used to find the solution to that prob- 
lem. Whatever the project comes up with, 
chances are it will sell, because there was a 
known need and a technical capability to match. 
Such products are quality, and sell at high value 
added. 
This article spells out the nature of the dual 
strategy in contrast to the old, and describes the 
very unique set of actions necessary to imple- 
ment  it profitably. Incidentally, the term "prod- 
uct" includes both goods and services; service 
firms often become technology driven because of 
their fixed base of service facilities. 
THE HISTORICAL VIEW 
T he traditional one-drive strategy has been  expressed in many  ways. Here are some examples: 
The planning approach will be very dif- 
ferent depending on whether  the com- 
pany's  business is based on "technology- 
push" or "demand-pull," and whether  
planning is controlled by the R&D or the 
marketing function. 
Some innovations arise in response to a 
documented  need or demand. They are 
often referred to as "needs-generated" or 
"technology-pull" innovations. This is in 
contrast to "means-generated" or "tech- 
nology-push" innovations, which arise 
from a technical capability. 
Ideas may be generated by the market- 
place . . . .  [S]uch market-pull ideas repre- 
sent the majority of  new product 
projects. But technology-push i d ea s - -  
which are generated by research or a 
serendipitous discovery--also play an 
important role. 
The first of these authors went  on to say, "It 
must be possible for innovations to find their way 
from the R&D department into the wider organi- 
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zation where  they can be 'commercialized. '  . . . 
To create an environment in which this 'commer-  
cialization' can take place, managers must pro- 
vide a clear division of responsibility be tween 
R&D and other company  functions." The new 
thinking says this "clear division" is just what we  
have too much of already. 
Years ago there were  fewer owners of key 
technologies, less competi t ion in the market- 
place, more time, and less need to optimize the 
firm's resources. But today managements  com- 
plain about  a raft of problems that hobble too 
many  of their new product programs. Here are 
the leading ones: 
1. Friction. Too many  people  spend too 
much time fighting with each other, squabbling 
over turf, missing signals, trying to adjust invisible 
pecking orders. Strategically opting for either 
technology or marketing is like deciding which 
member  of an outstanding double-play combina- 
tion deserves a bonus. 
2. Lost time. New product programs seem to 
be "a day late and a dollar short," with frequent 
postponements  and no real commitment  by the 
people  involved. 
3. Unnecessarily high costs. Much of the new 
product process is inefficient, with projects that 
abort, monies drained away to "more urgent" 
needs, and repeated starts, stops, and stuttering. 
4. Excessive involvement of top manage- 
ment. Some executives feel it's almost impossible 
to delegate new product projects. They have to 
settle arguments, make the critical decisions, aid 
in the communicating, and actually do much of 
the work  others should do. 
5. Poor products. Too many  fail or just never  
sell very well. Too many  are mediocre at best, 
with little real differentiation, little value added, 
and little salability. 
THE NEW VIEW 
O ne big reason for problems like these is that the people  working on new product projects do not work  together. They are 
separated by  the initial strategic decision to make 
one of two players the important one. If the firm 
uses market  drive, technology people  wait and 
respond, and vice versa. 
But what  happens  if the firm uses dual drive? 
The two key functions are merged and syner- 
gized. There is still drive, because the project 
needs leadership and purpose, but the partici- 
pants become  one rather than many. The func- 
tions are not just joined or connected; that's the 
way it was. Dual drive means one drive forged 
from the skills of two perspectives. New products 
shall exploit one or more of the firm's strong 
technologies and make a major contribution to 
solving specific customer problems. 
We shouldn't  call these teams "balanced," 
although the term has been  used in this connec- 
tion. Balance implies equality and scales. Look at 
the legs of a cha i r - -one  may do more work  than 
another, or be harder to build, or cost more or 
take longer, but it still takes four legs to make a 
good chair. 
I 've heard managers say, "We're using tech- 
nology and market in a 70/30 ratio." Guess who  
has to call whom? Can the problem be less im- 
portant than the solution, or vice versa? 
Examples 
Here are some examples, selected from different 
product situations. 
A consumer packaged good. Consumers 
like puddings and gelatins, but they want  inter- 
esting new "snacks." General Foods knew frozen 
technology and puddings. Put the two together 
and you have Jell-O Pudding Pops (and lots 
more). 
More complex  consumer packaged goods 
situation. S.C. Johnson found that people  were 
increasingly concerned about skin care problems. 
The company  also knew they had a strong 
monomer  and polymer film-forming technology. 
They added to it by acquiring a dermatology lab 
and put the dual focus to work  to come up with 
$22 million Soft Sense as a starter. 
Technical consumer durable. The Kodak 
Disc Camera came from a project that specifically 
combined the firm's disc technology with the 
consumers '  problem of taking pictures when  they 
were uncertain whether  there was enough light. 
As CEO Walter Fallon said, "New products must 
meet  the test of the laboratory and the market- 
place" ( " F a l l o n . . . "  1983) 
Standardized industrial products. Stan- 
dard Products Co., a very profitable $433 million 
firm in Cleveland, succeeds by doing two things: 
concentrating only on making door and window 
seals for the Big Three automakers (whose prob- 
lems they have grown to know very well) and 
refusing to make "anything that wasn' t  made by 
sandwiching layers of metal, rubber, and vinyl" 
(Reid 1987). 
Specialty industrial, low-tech. Signode 
assigned a specially appointed team to come up 
with new products that (1) exploited the firm's 
plastic extrusion technology and (2) met  the 
needs of the burgeoning manufactured foods 
market. Plastic trays for food producers to use in 
making microwaveable foods was their first new 
product, and the approach has now been  ex- 
tended to other teams. 
Technical industrial. As an example of 
what almost was, one maker  of optical scanning 
equipment  felt the business world needed a 
product for transferring a typed page to the com- 
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Figure 1 
Product Innovat ion  Strategies in Relation to Performance o f  the  Firm 
PRODUCT 
FIRMS IN INNOVATION 







High R&D spending 
Shotgun approach 
Attack new markets 
Low-budget, conservative 
Low R&D spending 
Undifferentiated products 





Low technological sophistication 
Familiar markets 




Large and growing markets 
Source.. Robert G. Cooper, "New Product Strategies: What Distinguishes the Top Peueormers, " 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, June 1984, pp. 151-164. 
purer. They combined that "need" with their opti- 
cal scanning technology and came up with some 
new products. Unfortunately, they didn't find out 
what the real need was: business firms wanted 
lower-cost ways of original computer  en t ry - -  
ways to eliminate the typed page, not optically 
scan it. 
Packag ing .  Cold cream, soup, fruit drinks, 
and toothpaste are just a few of the products 
where consumer disinterest in what they felt 
were  old-fashioned products was combined with 
new packaging technologies to produce what the 
market accepted immediately. 
Contrasts w i th  Related Concepts  
There is no shortage of concepts in management  
literature today, so dual drive must be distin- 
guished from several that may resemble it. First is 
the familiar product /market  matrix or technology/  
applications matrix, commonly  used in strategic 
market planning. These actually are descriptive 
devices, helping to display options. 
One can stay in any particular product/  
market box  or enter any particular box. 
If a technology or product is not cur- 
rently owned, it can be developed,  
rented, or bought. Strategically, the 
firm can use technology drive, market 
drive, or dual drive in any of the four 
boxes. 
A second related concept is the 
offensive/defensive typology. This 
usually means whether  one wants to 
lead (be first) or follow. And although 
many  authors associate offensive with 
R&D, all three drives can be used with 
any dimension of leadership. One can 
be first using market drive; one can be 
late using technology drive. 
Empirical Evidence 
To my knowledge, the only empirical 
study that compares the payoff  from 
differing new product strategies was 
done in Canada, and only with indus- 
trial firms. Other studies may be under 
way, but their findings are not avail- 
able. In the meantime, F igures  1 and 
2 show the Canadian findings. The 
study sorted respondent  firms into five 
strategy categories, based partly on 
focus, partly on aggressiveness, and 
partly on innovativeness. I have further 
grouped them by drive. 
The results are quite clear--f irms 
that were deliberately committed to 
both a market /need focus and to R&D 
won. In time we will see whether  
these findings hold up in other countries and 
other product categories. 
H o w  Dual Drive Helps Solve the Problems 
As a recap, let's go back to the five big problems 
managements  cite today and see how the new 
strategy helps solve them. 
Friction. In single drive there is often little 
incentive to work  with the other functions, since 
the leader tells others what is going to be  done. I 
know that marketers sometimes hope  technol- 
ogy-driven projects fail, just so the arbitrary tech- 
nocrats will be  knocked down a notch. I am told 
that the feelings in R&D are often about the same 
on market-driven projects. Friction is probably 
based most often on the very thing dual drive 
assures will not h a p p e n - - t w o  sets of opinions on 
what the market needs. 
Slowness.  Slowness is probably caused most 
by the friction just discussed. Second, it comes 
when  developers go beyond  customer needs and 
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add unnecessary product 
attributes (over-engineer). 
Third, dual drive softens the 
impact when  a key player 
leaves; single-drive projects 
are often dependent  on one 
person rather than a team. 
And fourth, dual drive helps 
avoid orphan projects, which 
are the slowest to move  
along. 
H i g h  costs .  All of the 
above factors cause costs to 
rise. Also, better communica-  
tion is increasingly seen as a 
cost-cutter. 
E x c e s s i v e  i n v o l v e m e n t  
o f  u p p e r  m a n a g e m e n t s .  
Perhaps the most direct ben-  
efit of dual drive is that it 
permits delegation based on 
agreement. All too often se- 
nior managements  must bud- 
get on faith faith in a person 
or in a technology. Dual drive 
hedges that bet by  involving a 
team of people  and at least 
two key players. The plan 
now has a proven need and 
an applicable technology. 
This gives the team strength 
to do what  some say is their 
toughest task: handle the 
Figure  2 
Relat ive  Succes s  o f  D i f f e r e n t  P r o d u c t  I n n o v a t i o n  Strategies  
THREE TYPES OF "DRIVEN" STRATEGIES 
1. Technology-Driven 
(Includes "Technology-driven" and 
"High-budget, diverse" from Figure 1) 
SUCCESS OF THE STRATEGIES 
Moderate to poor performance. 
Low success, low profitability, 
ranking near the bottom. 
2. Market-Driven 
(Includes "Low-budget, conservative" and 
"Defensive, focused, technologically deficient" 
from Figure 1) 
3. Dual-Drive 
(Includes "Balanced strategy" from Figure 1) 
Low budget was satisfactory in 
performance, but with little effect on 
sales and profits. Defensive was poor 
performance, and deficient on most 
measures. 
Fared the best. First on  nearly every 
per formance  measure.  
HOW SUCCESS WAS MEASURED 
1. Meeting new product program performance objectives 
2. Generating sales and profits 
3. Success of the program versus competitors 
4. Overall success of the program 
Source: Robert G. Cooper~ "New Product Strategies: What Distinguishes the Top Performers," 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, Jz, ne 1984, pp. 151-164. 
changing priorities of management .  On dual 
drive, the entire team resists arbitrary change, but 
on single drive there is usually only one resister, 
and other team members  privately back manage- 
m e n t - - e v e n  feeding information and assistance 
to them. 
P o o r  product s .  Dual drive avoids the worst 
o u t c o m e - - w h e n  buyers don't  want  or need the 
product technologists thought they should. It 
avoids trivial innovation, me-too products, and 
products with no value added. It resists the com- 
promises to insignificance. And defective prod- 
ucts are detected during development,  because 
dual drive requires that new products be  field 
tested with the customers whose  problem the 
company started with. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
M any managements  can buy the concept  
of dual drive quickly. They know that 
new products are "a mating of technol- 
ogy and markets." But to implement  dual drive is 
much tougher than they anticipate. Based on the 
experience of many  firms, it is a totally new way 
of thinking about new products and requires 
acceptance of several more key concepts. Here is 
a selection of the really difficult concepts, in the 
general sequence of action but not a complete 
step-by-step process. 
1. Dual drive requires identifying an impor- 
tant, unmet  customer need (present or certain 
future) before undertaking extensive R&D. This 
costs money  and may seem to slow down the 
real start of the project. Booz Allen & Hamilton 
research (1982) shows that more than 20 percent 
of the cost of new product development  is now 
spent prior to the start of R&D. 
2. Dual drive requires a thorough study of 
the identified n e e d - - w h o  has it, do they know" 
they have it, what have they done about  it, and 
what  are competitors doing? Even market-driven 
situations often take these matters for granted, 
and technology-driven projects almost always do. 
The Association of National Advertisers recently 
asked new products people  what they would 
most like additional money  for. At the top of their 
list was money  for more study of market situa- 
tions before technical work  is begun (Hoo and 
McDonald 1983). Too often we hear a technical 
person state unequivocally the preference of 
customers. Marketers do the same thing, some- 
times with a better base of information and 
sometimes not. 
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"Dual drive requires that 
team leaders be transfor- 
mational managers, fully 
able to grasp the nature 
and style of general man- 
agement, motivated to 
the longer-term payoff of 
project success, and able 
to fight off arrows in the 
back." 
3. Dual drive requires that, before R&D, at 
least one specific technology be identified that 
logically could hold the answer to some or all of 
the customer needs. In contrast, market-driven 
programs simply go to technologists and say "do 
this." 
4. If the firm lacks that technology, dual drive 
demands that it be  acquired. Too often R&D is 
motivated to depend on a weaker  technology 
and avoid calling for acquisition of the best one. 
Wise managements  avert this by having technol- 
ogy audits (some- 
times called technol- 
ogy assessments) 
done early on. These 
audits use a broad 
definition of technol- 
ogy, meaning the 
power  to do work or 
the power  to solve 
problems. This defini- 
tion includes ma- 
chines, processes, 
systems, and net- 
works; it also in- 
cludes particular 
persons'  minds, spe- 
cific sciences, pat- 
terns, and recipes. 
And it includes 
manufacturing pro- 
cesses and capabilities, distribution systems, and 
even management  processes (such as the product 
management  systems in consumer packaged 
goods firms). 
Occasionally a key technology may lie in a 
physicial entity (the 386 chip or MS-DOS), but 
technology is broader than that. If a firm is in the 
business of doing basic research to develop new 
technologies (say, Dow with Saran Wrap), these 
outputs in turn may become source or imple- 
mentable technologies for new product teams 
who  create what is eventually sold as a product. 
Or, the technology may itself be licensed or sold. 
5. Dual drive requires that resilience be  built 
in. This means anticipating future changes in the 
market need and in the selected technology, and 
being sure of a place to move to if changes block 
the new program during development.  A dual 
drive program rarely aborts or waffles, because 
the system is based on key strengths in the orga- 
nization. 
6. Dual drive requires forming a team of all 
functions that will be of  major importance in the 
project. How often over recent years have we 
been told that manufacturing people  should be 
involved from the beginning? But they often are 
not, as firms say they cannot afford the costs of 
teams or they lack the people  to staff teams. It 
takes at least two people  (R&D and marketing) to 
have dual drive, and those two usually demand a 
full team. 
7. Dual drive requires that team members  get 
a clear assignment with objectives for that team. 
They should know their customer need/technol-  
ogy mandate,  of course, but they should also 
know their objectives. Are they to produce any- 
thing other than profits, such as sales, market 
share, viable position in a new market, thwarting 
of competitive positions, or enhancement  of im- 
age? It is surprising how often team problems 
stem from differing guesses about team objec- 
tives. 
8. Dual drive means there must be a plan 
that spreads out big dollar commitments consis- 
tent with the developing information pool. We 
should spend wisely. It is not just government  
bureaucrats who  spend authorized money  as 
soon as they can; functions tend to as well, if the 
spenders are free to do so without other func- 
tions' concurrence. 
9. Dual drive requires that project priori W 
decisions be made at the general management  
level. These priorities are then used to guide all 
functional groups working on new product 
projects. At present, many  R&D departments and 
marketing departments prepare their own project 
priorities without enough help from the other 
functions. How sad it is to see a technical group 
planning a market su rvey to  estimate future mar- 
ket needs as input to their internal priori W set- 
ting. 
Most R&D units like to portfolio their budgets 
to keep some money  available for basic (wildcat- 
ring) work. Du Pont, for example,  allocates 17 
percent of their billion-dollar budget  for that 
purpose. Such funds are true technology-driven 
situations and support  maverick technologies and 
maverick people. But they are high-risk projects, 
outside dual drive. 
10. Management should make sure there is 
indeed dual drive. There may be form without 
substance; setting up teams does not generate 
teamwork. They need supportive functional man- 
agement  heads in the departments and an honest 
desire to make their functions subservient to the 
twin drives in the project assignment. 
11. Dual drive requires that team leaders be 
transformational managers, fully able to grasp the 
nature and style of  general management ,  moti- 
vated to the longer-term payoff  of project suc- 
cess, and able to fight off arrows in the back. 
Most firms don't  have enough of these people  to 
staff truly general management  positions, let 
alone a group of new product teams. Fortunately, 
many  dedicated functional managers remain 
functional in their perspective , but manage to 
deal constructively with dual drive, After all, un- 
der single drive it was win - lose - -now it's win- 
win. 
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EXCEPTIONS/CRITICISMS 
E 
very good strategy has its exceptions. 
Some firms don' t  really want  innovative 
products - - they  take their cues from com- 
petition. Or they commit totally to opera t ions - -  
solid quality at the lowest cost. Executives from 
these firms skipped this article. 
But other firms say they don' t  want  dual 
drive; they say they are technology committed 
and base their new products entirely on technical 
innovation. But the most successful ones (Merck, 
Herman Miller, Intel, among others) are not really 
one-sided at all. Merck's scientists know full well 
what the medical problems of the physician are. 
Herman Miller's furniture designers work  well 
apart from marketing and are actually encour- 
aged not to ask for market research reports. But 
in fact they are very close to the world's business 
office, personally. Herman Miller's famous Action 
Office designer, Bob Propst, lived in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, more than 100 miles from the firm's 
marketers. But he literally immersed himself in 
the problems of the office. Dual drive calls for a 
customer problem, not necessarily that the prob- 
lem originate in the marketing department.  
Du Pont represents another technology- 
driven firm. But it is usually not oblivious to the 
needs of its customers either; it knew that the 
carpet industry badly needed something to give 
added resistance to stains. Stainmaster was not a 
technology shot in the dark. But Kevlar may have 
been, and the firm has spent years looking for 
problems that needed the Kevlar solution. And 
Du Pont was surprised to learn that most golfers 
didn't want  plastic golf shoes. Edwin Land had 
no doubts that people  wanted to see their still 
photographs quickly, but he couldn't  find a prob- 
lem for Polavision to solve. 
Goodyear  didn't need vehicle makers '  assur- 
ance that synthetic rubber tires would be useful. 
Salk didn't need a sales manager  to tell him that 
doctors would like a polio vaccine if he found 
one. Consumers opted against play-only TV de- 
vices in favor of play-and-record ones. 
Most worthwhile scientific discoveries have 
been based on well-understood market  needs, 
whereas most scientific bombs  have not. Unfortu- 
nately, it is sometimes considered blasphemous 
for a scientist to advocate dual drive. 
Owens-Coming had a revealing experience 
in the mid-1980s. It took a technology-driven 
approach to the problem of cracked highways. 
The approach failed totally. A second attempt, 
with a new team, involved highway people  from 
the very beginning, and succeeded instantly. 
T his article has focused on a growing prac- tice in the management  of product inno- v a t i o n - t h a t  of discarding technology 
drive and market  drive in favor of drive by both, 
or dual drive. Every new product project is fo- 
cused on a clear and confirmed customer prob- 
lem and on a specific technology (in R&D, in 
operations, or wherever)  that management  thinks 
holds the answer to that problem. Neither of the 
two forces drives anything alone. Together they 
can drive powerful, profitable solutions. 
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